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RECENT DECISIONS
These cases will seemingly be upset by the Supreme Court only if
it finds that the Jenks decision was founded upon the principles of
fundamental justice.41  If the Court should find that the Jenks de-
cision states a rule which is the very fiber of due process and not
merely a new rule for the federal judiciary,42 the conscientious ob-
jector cases will meet with the Court's displeasure. Quite possibly the
Jenks statute will be called unconstitutional since it restricts a ruling
which is an expression of due process. If such a result should occur,
it is quite possible that the Jenks ruling would be extended to pre-
trial disclosure and to disclosure of grand jury testimony. The better
opinion seems to be that since the Supreme Court did not mention
due process, it was merely exercising its rule-making power.43 If this
opinion is correct, the cases discussed here will probably not be over-
ruled. Nevertheless, the Jenks decision has not been relegated to the
history books by the new statute and it will continue to arouse a
great deal of discussion and controversy.
ROBERT ULRICH
Contracts-Insurer's Breach-Application of Rest. of Con-
tracts §318-Plaintiff was the beneficiary under a fifteen year en-
dowment policy with family income provisions taken out by her de-
ceased spouse. On the original application, insured received a 20-
year endowment policy with family income provisions for a twenty
year term, dated February 1, 1939. A few months after receipt of
this policy, insured made application to convert the policy to the 15-
year endowment with the income provisions for fifteen years. The
41 United States v. Consolidated Laundries Corp., 159 F. Supp. 860, at 868 (S.D.
N.Y. 1958). See also 56 Mich. L. Rev. 314, at 316 (1957).42 In United States v. Consolidated Laundries Corp., 159 F. Supp. 860, at 868(S.D. N.Y. 1958), judge Palmieri states: "The constitutionality of 18 U.S.-
C.A. 3500 (Supp. V.) has been implicitly recognized by the Second Circuit in
United States v. Miller, 248 F. 2d 163, cert. denied, 355 U.S. 905 (1957), in
which the Court held that upon remand the procedure to be followed in pro-
ducing documents would be that established by the statute." In footnote 15,
the Judge states: "There is no indication that either the Jenks or Gordon deci-
sions rested on a constitutional basis."
43Supra note 41.
44 In a recent decision, Scales v. United States, 260 F. 2d 21 (4th Cir. 1958) which
appeared subsequent to the writing of this article, the 4th Circuit Court of Ap-
peals passed upon the question of the constitutionality of subsection (c) of the
new statute. The Court stated that the procedure to be followed under subsec-
tion (c) of the statute does not violate due process of law. but is merely a
procedural regulation within the power of Congress to enact. The Court
seems to withdraw somewhat from the language of the Jenks case. It says:
"The standard set by Jenks, 353 U.S. at 669, that justice requires no less than
that the defense be entitled to see the reports to determine what use may be
made of them is satisfied [by the new statute] and justice requires no more."
[Italics ours]. The rest of the Jenks statute has not been passed upon but
from the language of the Court in this case, it seems probable that the
statute will weather attacks on the grounds of its constitutionality, providing
the United States Supreme Court agrees with the lower courts.
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policy, as amended, was dated May 31, 1939. When the policy was
issued, however, the company issued a 15-year endowment with family
income provisions for 20 years. Insured died in 1945 with all pre-
miums paid to date, at which time Plaintiff sent the policy with proof
of death to the Defendant, John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Com-
pany. Insurer acknowledged receipt of the policy and began paying
Plaintiff the monthly payments under the income provision up to and
including the payment of February 1, 1954,1 at which time Defendant
offered the lump sum payment on the endowment policy but refused
to make further income payments. Plaintiff sought to recover the
income payments for five more years according to the policy. The
Defendant based its refusal on an alleged error in writing the con-
tract, saying that it never isued a policy in which the income benefits
extended over a period longer than the period for premium payments
on the main policy.
The district court held that the company was bound by the con-
tract as written, and that the application was not a part of the con-
tract. It was also mentioned that the insured neither knew, nor could
have known of the alleged error, and the decision did not include a
finding of mistake. The significant feature of the trial court decision
concerns the damages awarded. The court found the Defendant guilty
of an anticipatory breach and awarded Plaintiff the lump sum due on
the endowment policy plus the total value of the future payments, dis-
counting the value of future interest. From this judgment the De-
fendant appealed. Held: Affirmed the findings of fact, but reversed
as to damages, decreeing that the future installments were to be paid
as they fell due.
2
The court's discussion of damages and the applicability of the
doctrine of anticipatory breach to a unilateral contract for the payment
of money provides an opportunity for a discussion of anticipatory
breach and damages as it applies to the limited field of insurance
contracts.
The prevailing law on this subject is expressed in the Restatement
of Contracts, Section 3183 and is espoused by Williston.4 Corbin takes
a position against the rule. 5 He divides the insurance cases into two
classes: "Those in which the insurer undertakes to pay a definite sum
I This would have been the end of the fifteen year period.
2 John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Cohen, 254 F. 2d 417 (9th Cir. 1958).
3 PRESTATEMENT, CONTRACrS §318 (1932), amended 1948. "In the case (1) of a
bilateral contract that has not become unilateral by full performance on one
side, and (2) of a unilateral contract where the agreed exchange for the
promise or for its performance has not been given, any of the following acts,
done without justification by a promisor in a contract before he has com-
mitted a breach under the rule stated in sections 314-315, constitutes an anti-
cipatory repudiation which is a total breach of contract ......
45 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS §§1328-1329 (Rev. ed. 1937).S 4 CORBIN, CONTRACTS §968 (1951).
[Vol. 42
RECENT DECISIONS
of money at a specific future time or on the happening of a future
event that is certain to occur, but the time of which is uncertain,"
and ."disability and annuity policies, providing for periodic payments
for an indefinite time, it being wholly impossible to determine in ad-
vance the total amount that may eventually have to be paid." Cases
are cited from fifteen jurisdictions in support of his statement that
under the first category above, "an action lies at once for anticipatory
repudiation by an insurer, either for the recovery of premiums paid
or damages."6  In the second class the weight of authority is heavily
against an action for anticipatory breach.7  Apparently in only one
jurisdiction was such an action allowed, and future installments re-
covered.8  The landmark case is New York Life Ins. Co. v. Viglas.9
Justice Cardozo's decision in the Viglas case'0 has had great influence,
even though it was deprived of its authority by the decision in Erie v.
Thompkins.11 Perhaps some of its popularity is undeserved since the
case was decided on the grounds of good faith mistake, and therefore
no absolute repudiation. It does not state a hard and fast rule against
the application of anticipatory breach to such cases."
r Ibid, n. 35.
75 WILLISTON, CoNTRcrs §1330A nn. 4 & 5 (Rev. ed. (1937) ; 4 CoRBIN, CON-
TRACTS §969 (1951).8 Texas, Commercial Travelers Cas. Co. v. Dymke, 279 S.W. 2d 405 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1955); American Cas. Co. v. McCuiston, 202 S.W. 2d 474 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1947). In both cases an action for anticipatory breach was allowed on
a disability policy, and future installments were recovered as damages.
0 297 U.S. 672 (1936). In this action for the anticipatory breach of a disability
policy the relief sought was denied, and the case of Federal Life Ins. Co. v.
Rascoe, 12 F. 2d 693 (6th Cir. 1926) was expressly overruled. In the Rascoe
case, Plaintiff was entitled to disability payments upon proof of total dis-
ability every thirty days. After making payments for seven months, De-
fendant insurer refused to make further payments. The court held that the
insurer had repudiated the contract, and avoided the rule later set forth in
the Restatement, Contracts §318 (1932), by holding the contract to be bi-
lateral with a continuing obligation, the continuing obligation being the re-
quirement that insured furnish monthly evidence of continuing disability.
The court said that public policy required the insured to maintain only one
suit for all damages.
10 297 U.S. 672 (1936).
"1304 U.S. 64 (1938).
"297 U.S. 672, 679, 680, 682 (1936). "We have no thought to suggest an
invariable rule whereby the full value of a bargain may never be recovered
for any breach of contract falling short of repudiation or intentional abandon-
ment. . . .Even then, the rights that are his may depend upon the grounds
of the rejection or the nature of the default, whether intentional or wil-
full .... On the other hand a party to a contract who has no longer any obliga-
tion of performance on his side, but is in a position of an annuitant or a
creditor exacting payment from a debtor may be compelled to wait for the
installments as they severally mature, just as a landlord may not accelerate
the rent for the residue of the term because the rent is in default for a
month or a year. (cases cited). . . ." Citing the distinction between the rule
applicable to a Contract for payment of money and the rule applicable for
the performance of services or the delivery of merchandise, the court says,
at 680, "The root of any valid distinction is not in the difference between
money and merchandise or money and services. What counts decisively is
the relation between the maintenance of the contract and the frustrations of
the end it was expected to subserve. The ascertainment of this relation calls
1959]
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An attempt to place the present case into one of Corbin's classi-
fications shows the case to be a rather exceptional one. The case does
not fit into Corbin's first class,13 exemplified by most life insurance
contracts in which a definite sum of money is payable at death or at
the end of a specified period of time. Corbin states that the majority
of the reported cases falling within his first classifiication allow the
action for anticipatory breach. The cases cited in support of this
assertion however, appear to be executory, and therefore not within
the rule of Rest. of Contracts Section 318. The sum due in the
present case is fixed, but the manner of payment is different, i.e.,
not a lump sum, but distributed over a period of time. In addition,
the payment of the money is not contingent upon a specified future
event or a specified future time, certain to occur, but uncertain as
to time. Here the event has already happened, the death of the in-
sured. The cases cited by Corbin involved wrongful refusal to ac-
cept payment of premiums,' 4 wrongful cancellation of policies, 5 or
attempts to alter the terms of the contract.'" If a life insurance con-
tract may be considered executory until a present duty of payment
arises in the insurer, all of Corbin's cases may be considered such.
On the other hand, the present case involves a fully executed contract.
The premiums have been paid, and the present duty of the insurer
has arisen as a result of the death of the insured. None of Corbin's
cases were instituted on a fully paid and executed policy. 17
for something more than the mechanical application of a uniform formula.
To determine whether a breach avoids the contract as a whole, one must
consider what is necessary to work out reparations in varying conditions."
The essence of the decision is stated in the conclusion, at 682, "The declara-
tion in the case at hand makes a showing of present breach. It does not
make a showing of a breach so willful and material as to make accelera-
tion of future benefits essential to the attainment of present reparation."
Thus the finding of present breach seems to be makeweight argument, which
will not be a binding factor where a willful and material breach is found.
134 CoRBiN, CONTRACTS §968 (1951).
14 Alabama Gold Life Ins. Co. v. Garmany, 74 Ga. 51 (1884); Speer v. Phoenix
Mutual Life Ins. Co., 36 Hun. 322 (N.Y. 1885).
-5 Merrick v. Northwestern Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 124 Wis. 221, 102 N.W. 593(1905) ; Am. Ins. Union v. Woodard, 118 Okla. 248, 247 Pac. 398 (1926).
"'Fed. Life Ins. Co. v. Maxim, 70 Ind. App. 266, 117 N.E. 801 (1919); Ebert
v. Mut. Reserve Fund Life Ass'n., 81 Minn. 116, 83 NW. 506 (1900).
"One of the cases cited by Corbin was also cited by Plaintiff in the present
case, Caminetti v. Manierre, 23 Cal. 2d 94, 142 P.2d 41 (1943). In this case the
insured held a non-cancellable disability policy when the insurer became in-
solvent. The court held that the inability to perform was equivalent to total
repudiation and allowed the anticipatory breach action. The court in the
present case responded by citing the rule laid down in two disability cases.
Brix v. People's Mut., 2 Cal. 2d 446, 41 P. 2d 537 (1935), and Cobb v. Pacific
Mut. Life Ins. Co., 4 Cal. 2d 565, 51 P. 2d 84 (1935). The Brix case was an ac-
tion to recover future payments, which the court denied on the grounds that
the insurer's breach did not work a breach of the entire contract, but affected
the rights of the insured only in respect to the accrued payments. The court
also said that there was no breach as to the future, since the payments were
contingent upon continued disability. It is interesting to note that neither the
good faith test, nor the approach of the Rascoe case, supra note 9, were men-
[Vol. 42
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In spite of the similarity in the manner of payment, class two' is
equally inapplicable for two reasons. 1. The payments in the present
case are for a prescribed period of time as against the indefinite period
in class two. Disability payments are conditioned on the inability of
the insured to work, most commonly permanent and total disability.
The policy in the present case is a life insurance policy, and there is
no such condition which must be filled before the right to payment
arises. 2. The total amount which will eventually be paid is fixed by
contract, and is easily determined. No change in the health or cir-
cumstances will effect the amount which the plaintiff will receive.
Plaintiff above, attempted to prove its case for the anticipatory
breach by basing it upon the reasons advanced by Corbin in class two.
One of Corbin's fears in denying the action and the future damages
here is that the insured will be forced by a hostile and uncooperative
insurer to go into court to get every payment to which he is entitled.10
The court in Cobb v. Pacific Mutual Life Ins. Co. 2 0 meets this argu-
ment by saying "It would seem that a reasonably sound business policy
would of itself be a sufficient consideration to deter an insurer against
practices which could not do otherwise than discredit it. Besides, the
law ought to be able to offer relief where compensation is willfully
and contumaciously withheld." 21 This statement seems to contain an
implied threat to the insurance companies. If the policy behind the
Restatement rule is to protect the debtor or one who must borrow
from an acceleration of payments not provided for in the contract, the
logic of the rule becomes apparent in the case of an individual who
borrows from a loan company or purchase goods on a conditional
sales contract which is financed by a financing house. 22 However, an
tioned. The Cobb decision involved an alleged misrepresentation on the
application. The court there gave lip-service to the Brix decision and recited
the Restatement rule, but a greater part of the opinion was devoted to the
question of good faith. The court said at 88, "The installments as they be-
come due are but debts. Yet if the insurer in good faith and with color of
right challenges the good faith of the insured and fails to prevail in an
action, he is required to pay a large gross amount, although the insured is
suffering from a permanent progressive disease and will not probably live
the period of expectancy that a person in normal health would live," and
again at page 88, "It is admitted that there is some authority for the applica-
tion of this rule in cases so clearly within the doctrine of anticipatory breach
that there is no room for question, but at best it is a drastic rule and should
not be applied to a contract in which the parties impliedly recognize the right
of contest." What the court means by "an implied right of contest" is not
clear, but there seems to be a strong basis for the conclusion that this court,
like Justice Cardozo, does not wish to state an inflexible rule and in the
proper fact situation would decide differently.
184 CoRBiN, CoNTRAcrs §968 (1951).
19 4 CoRBi r, CONTRACrS §969 (1951).
204 Cal. 2d 565, 51 P. 2d 84 (1935); see supra note 17.
21 Id. at 88.
22 Even here the borrower has little choice anymore, since most such contracts
contain an acceleration clause in a pre-printed form, so the benefit of the rule
to the borrower is negligible.
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insurance company obviously is not the debtor of the insured in the
above sense, and does not need the protection that the Restatement
rule affords to the commercial borrower. In addition, the insurance
company writes the contract and the prospective insured has no bar-
gaining power in deciding its terms.
The bad faith argument appears frequently in the disability cases,
and it seems that it would be an important consideration in life in-
surance cases where the payments are to be made periodically. Since
the condition precedent to the obligation of payment is death, it is
more unlikely that a good faith dispute will arise when death is the
condition than when the condition is proof of permanent and total
disability. In five states2 3 there has been legislative efforts which
apparently are in response to this problem. These statutes are de-
signed to prevent insurance companies from arbitrarily denying the
insured the fruits of his contract. The Tennessee statute 24 does not
refer to any specific type of policy. Since it exempts good faith
refusals, the penalty imposed does not seem unduly high, and even in
the absence of good faith, the amount of the penalty will depend upon
the actual injuries suffered.2 5 The Tennessee legislature also enacted
a legislative deterent to those who might seek to take advantage of
Sec. 56-1105 at the expense of the insurance company, imposing a
penalty on an insured who brings a claim in bad faith.
2 6
The statutes of the four other states are similar with the exception
that none have a provision to discourage the bringing of false claims.
The Arkansas statute27 limits the recovery on the penalty of twelve
21 Tennessee, Louisiana, Missouri, Arkansas, and Georgia.
24 TENN. CODE ANN. §56-1105 (1955). "Additional liability upon insurers for
failure to pay promptly insurance losses when refusal is not made in good
faith.
"The insurance companies of this state, and foreign insurance companies
and other persons doing an insurance business in this state, in all cases when
a loss occurs and they refuse to pay the same within sixty (60) days after
a demand shall have been made by the holder of the policy on which said
loss occurred, shall be liable to pay the holder of said policy, in addition to
the loss and interest thereon, a sum not exceeding twenty-five (25%) percent
on the liability for said loss; provided, that it shall be made to appear to the
court or jury trying the case that the refusal to pay said loss was not in
good faith, and that such failure to pay inflicted additional expense, loss, or
injury upon the holder of said policy; and, provided, further that such ad-
ditional liability, within the limit prescribed, shall, in the discretion of the
court or jury trying the case, be measured by the additional expense, loss,
and injury thus entailed."
25 In King v. Mut. Life Ins. Co. of N.Y., 114 F. Supp. 700 (E.D. Tenn. 1953),
the statutory penalty was imposed on an insurer in a disability case. In spe-
cifically denying the requested future payments, the court said at 702, "This
remedy is not allowance of damages for anticipatory breach of the insurance
contract It is impliedly a recognition that cases will arise where insurance
companies will not act in good faith in their refusal to pay accrued insurance
benefits. For such cases the statute provides a recoverable penalty of twenty-
five percent of the amount recovered as a result of the Plaintiff's lawsuit
against the insured."
26 TENN. CODE ANN. §56-1106 (1955).27 ARK. STAT. ANN. §66-514 (1947).
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percent plus reasonable attorney's fees if the claim is not paid within
the time stated in the policy after proof of loss (or death) has been
made. An interesting feature of the Arkansas law is that good faith
is not mentioned, and is not a defense for the insurer. This act has
been upheld as constitutional, 2s but on its face it seems to impose a
strict liability on the insurer. The Georgia statute29 provides for a
penalty up to 25 percent of the amount of the claim plus attorney's
fees if a claim is not paid within sixty days, if bad faith appears. The
Louisiana act30 has different penalties depending upon the type of
policy held. If an insurer fails to make payment within sixty days
after proof of death on a life policy, without just cause, a penalty
of six percent interest from the date of proof is imposed. In health
and accident policies a penalty of double the amount of the benefits
during the period of delay plus attorney's fees fixed by the court, is
levied against the insurer if he does not pay within thirty days after
the claim has been made. The Louisiana legislature has taken a page
from tort negligence law in determining whether the punitive measures
should be imposed; that is, there will be a penalty unless grounds
exist, in the opinion of the court or jury, which would put a reason-
able and prudent business man on his guard. This is a slight modi-
fication of the Tennessee provision, since the decision will be based
not upon whether or not the insurer was in good faith in denying
the claim, but whether there were reasonable grounds upon which
to base a denial. In Missouri3 l the court may penalize the insurer
up to ten percent and reasonable attorney's fees on any type of in-
surance policy, where it appears that the company has vexatiously
refused to pay the claim.
. The Kentucky courts have devised an installment judgment,3 2
similar to specific performance, which seems to be a satisfactory
solution, but it has not been adopted in other jurisdictions. Although
this type of judgment was criticized in an earlier California case,3 3 the
2SLife and Cas. Ins. Co. of Tenn. v. McCray, 291 U.S. 566 (1934). The decision
was written by Justice Cardozo and is not significantly inconsitent with his
decision in the Viglas case. See also, Trammel, One State's Experience With
The Statutory Remedy for Insurer's Delays, A Problem in Payment, 10 Ark
L. Rev. 439 (1956).
29 GA. CODE ANN. §56-706 (1953 Revision).
3 0 LA. Rzv. STAT. §§22:656-22:658 (1950).31 Mo. RFv. STAT. §375.420 (1949).
32 Equitable Life Assur. Soc'y of U.S. v. Branham, 250 Ky. 472, 63 S.W.2d 498
(1933), and Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. Hampton, 252 Ky. 145, 65
S.W.2d 980 (1934).
33 Although these cases were criticized in Brix v. Pacific Mutual, discussed in
supra note 17, the court in the present case awarded appreciably the samejudgment, decreeing that "the future installments shall be paid when they
fall due, together with the final lump sum payment." 254 F.2d at 427. A
strong argument can be set forth for this type of judgment since it will not
have same effect as an acceleration on the insurer, but will give the insured
a respite from starting a new suit as each payment falls due.
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result in the present case bears a strong resemblance to the install-
ment judgment without calling it such. Corbin approves of this type
of relief in cases where there is extreme difficulty in making a rea-
sonable estimate of probable future damages. 34  However, he cri-
ticizes the error into which some courts have fallen by failing to dis-
tinguish between specific performance and anticipatory breach. He
also disapproves of the reference, in anticipatory breach actions, to
"acceleration of payments" and "acceleration of maturity," when de-
scribing the effect of the judgment. 35
To allow the action for anticipatory breach, on the other hand,
may give rise to problems of policy in cases such as the one under
discussion. One factor to be considered in the life insurance cases is
the intent of the insured in making the contract. If the insured has
contracted to have the money paid in installments, the action under
consideration may produce the very result that the insured desired to
avoid. For example, he may not want a large sum of money placed
in the hands of his widow or other beneficiary, who may be in-
experienced in business matters. Another argument against the action
becomes apparent when the relationship of the parties is considered.
In the present case, as in most life insurance cases, the beneficiary is
a mere third party donee beneficiary, and has given up nothing, the
payments being a gratuity. The insured under the disability policy
seems to have a more justifiable reason for recovery on grounds of
an anticipatory breach since he is an active party to the contract, and
has actually given up something in that he has made the premium
payments. It would follow then that the insured in the latter case
has a greater interest to protect than the donee beneficiary of the life
policy. Of course, if the latter were a creditor beneficiary his interest
would be on a par with the disabled insured.
CONCLUSION
Although the Cohen case lies in the twilight zone between the oft-
344 CORiwiN, CONTRACTS §969 (1951).
354 CORBIN, CONTRACTS §965 (1951). Specific performance is an equitable remedy
which the courts apply almost exclusively to contracts for the sale of land,
or when an article of a peculiar and unique nature or value is concerned.
Anticipatory breach is an action at law. Because of the similarity of result,
when the contract is one for the payment of money, courts are hesitant to
give the legal remedy. Corbin says, "It is merely an accidental circumstance
that where the contractual duty is a duty to pay money, the performance
that is expressly promised is identical in character with the performance that
is required by a judgment for money damages." Anticipatory breach dam-
ages are for the present value of the full amount, and the Plaintiff can get
a judgment for more than the actual value if he can prove the loss. This also
serves to point out the error in referring to the damages as "accelerating the
payments or date of maturity." The contract is not rewritten by the judgment
so that the date of maturity is advanced. The true effect is that as a result
of the defendant's breach by anticipatory repudiations, a present determination




litigated poles of fixed-sum life insurance policies and the disability
policies with periodic payment provisions, the decision offers encour-
agement to those who would like to see the rule of Section 31836 re-
laxed in respect to insurance cases. The statutes of at least five states
and the instalment judgments of Kentucky reflect an acute awareness,
in some quarters, that it is the insured, and not the insurer, who is
in need of protection. If, as Justice Cardozo3 7 says in quoting the
Cobb"5 case, the law can offer appropriate relief when an insurer
withholds compensation in bad faith, then justice can be done.
Whether this is done by statutory penalty, installment judgments, or
by the invocation of the doctrine of anticipatory breach is immaterial,
but the Plaintiff should not be denied a remedy in the other jurisdic-
tions merely because a bard and fast rule exists. The old cliche,
"When the reason for a rule ceases, the rule itself ceases," seems to
apply with particular vigor here. In decreeing that the future pay-
ments are to be made as they fall due, it seems that the court has
reached a satisfactory conclusion without damage to the rule.
RUPERT J. GioH, JR.
Defamation-Liability of Station Owners for Political Broad-
casts-During the course of a political broadcast, a candidate for
the United States Senate made libelous remarks concerning the Plain-
tiff corporation. The corporation brought suit for defamation against
the station owners. The Defendants admitted that the speech was
libelous per se but claimed that Section 315 of the 1934 Federal Com-
munications Act' relieved them from liability. On appeal, the North
Dakota Supreme Court upheld Defendant's contention of immunity.
The court construed the prohibition against censorship in Section 315
to be an absolute prohibition which precluded a licensee from deleting
even obviously libelous matter. Further, the court held that Section
315 granted complete immunity from liability for defamatory state-
ments made by candidates, if such statements were germane to the
political issues involved. Farmers Educ. and Co-op Union of America,
No. Dakota Div. v. WDAY, Inc., 89 N. W. 2d 102 (N.D. 1958).
Decisions of state courts, prior to this, have been in conflict as to
36 See supra note 3.
3 New York Life Ins. Co. v. Viglas, 297 U.S. 672, 681 (1936).
3 Cobb v. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co., 4 Cal. 2d 565, 51 P.2d 84 (1935).
148 STAT. 1088 (1934), 47 U.S.C. §315 (1946). "If any licensee shall permit
any person who is a legally qualified candidate for any public office to use a
broadcasting station, he shall afford equal opportunities to all other such can-
didates for that office in the use of such broadcasting station: Provided, that
such licensee shall have no power of censorship over the material broadcast
under the provisions of this section. No obligation is imposed upon any
licensee to allow the use of its station by any such candidate."
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